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Abstract
In this paper we measure experienced guilt in a prisoner’s dilemma
experiment with pre-play communication. We ﬁnd that feelings of
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11 Introduction
A robust ﬁnding in social dilemma experiments is that communication prior
to play of the game increases cooperation dramatically (see Ledyard, 1995;
Sally, 1995; Ostrom, 2006; Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007, for overviews). Social
psychologists, behavioral economists and sociologists alike have striven to
understand the fundamental motivation behind this eﬀect.
Researchers have reached a rather undisputed consensus about the prime
driving force of the beneﬁcial eﬀect of communication on cooperation. Com-
munication is seen as something enabling parties to establish an informal
agreement on which actions should be taken.1 Orbell et al. (1988) and Kerr
and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), for example, show that successful commu-
nication often consists of making promises and engaging in a commitment
to cooperate. Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) conclude, on the basis of an
overview of experiments on communication and cooperation, that communi-
cation makes people focus on pro-social norms and allows them to develop
mutual beliefs about behavior.
This paper contributes to this literature by measuring how experienced
guilt reacts to agreements and choices in such a setting. Subjects in our ex-
periment play an anonymous, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with mon-
etary incentives. Prior to play, they have an opportunity to communicate a
willingness to cooperate. After the actions in the dilemma have been chosen,
guilt valences are elicited twice, both before and after revealing the matched
participant’s choice.
Guilt is viewed as a mediation emotion by social psychologists. Baumeis-
ter et al. (1994), in particular, adopt the view that the main function of
guilt is interpersonal: it enforces communal norms by providing incentives to
avoid transgressions that harm others. Based on this view, the measurement
of guilt may help to identify whether and how strong a norm a certain behav-
ioral proﬁle is. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, it is natural to focus on
the norm of cooperation and the impact of a mutual cooperative agreement
on this cooperative norm.
The importance of guilt as such a mediation and enforcement emotion has
been highlighted in recent studies in social psychology and in economics.2 In
1Other potential eﬀects of communication such as, for example, decreasing social dis-
tance, increasing solidarity and creation of group identity have been shown to be at most
partial explanations (see, e.g., Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer, 1998; Brosig et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006). Bicchieri (2002) views creating
group identity in itself as a trigger for norm-abiding behavior.
2See Eisenberg (2000) for an overview of social psychology studies and see, for in-
stance, Akerlof (1980); Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000); Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004);
2their guilt-aversion model, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) assume that
promises convey information about intended choices and that agents do not
want to let down the other by acting counter to what the other expects them
to do. Miettinen (2006) and Lopez-Perez (2008) assume that transgressions
of a cooperative norm only induce feelings of guilt when others stick to the
norm. Experimental studies have shown that guilt and shame indeed play a
crucial role in social situations. Ketelaar and Au (2003) show that people who
feel guilty after having defected in a social dilemma game tend to cooperate
more in further repetitions of the game. Hopfensitz and Reuben (2007) ﬁnd
that someone who is punished for having defected, will not retaliate in the
future only if she feels guilty or ashamed.
We ﬁnd that people only feel guilty about defecting if the partner has not
defected as well. We also ﬁnd that guilt feelings about defecting are stronger
when a mutual agreement to cooperate has been reached than without such
agreement. Moreover, when a small monetary ﬁne is imposed on unilateral
defectors, guilt feelings of unilateral defectors are signiﬁcantly reduced. This
latter pattern is consistent with the result from previous experiments (see,
e.g., Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b; Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), that an extrinsic incentive
to adhere to norm-abiding behavior might crowd-out the intrinsic incentive
to stick to a pro-social norm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design and procedure and the research hypotheses. Section 3 has the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Design, procedure and hypotheses
The experiment was run in January 2007 in the computer laboratory of
the Max Planck Institute of Economics with a total of 140 students from
diﬀerent ﬁelds of study at the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena, Germany.
Participants were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) and
the experiment was programmed with z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
After being seated at a visually isolated computer terminal, participants
received written instructions (see appendix A for an English translation).
Understanding of the rules was assured by a control questionnaire that sub-
jects had to answer before the experiment could start.
Each participant was randomly paired with another participant and played
a simple prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game with payoﬀs in Euro as depicted in
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006); Miettinen (2006); Lopez-Perez (2008) in the theoretical
economics literature.
3table 1. Eventually, they were asked to choose option 1 (defect) or option
2 (cooperate). Yet, before entering the choices in the PD, each participant
had the choice between either not communicating or communicating to the
other that she would like them both to cooperate.3 They were told that
communication was not binding. After the communication phase, subjects
received information about the matched participant’s willingness to engage
in a cooperative agreement.
When choices in the PD had been made, a new computer screen appeared
where ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs were elicited. We preferred simplicity
over precision and, thus, each participant was paid an additional 0.5 Euro,
ﬁrst, for correctly predicting the choice of the participant they were paired
with, and second, for correctly predicting the other’s prediction of one’s own
choice. Total earnings were revealed at the end of the experiment only (the
sum of earnings from the PD game and earnings from predicting the matched
participant’s choice and prediction).
Beliefs were elicited to allow us to deal with a potential reverse causality
between feelings of guilt and decisions in the PD. If guilt enforces agreements,
then it is the incentive to avoid guilt feelings that keeps agents from breach-
ing. Thus rather than the outcome causing guilt valences, the expected guilt
valences might cause the outcome. To study the robustness of our results,
we circumvent the issue of reverse causality by studying players who expect
their opponent to defect. These players should not expect to suﬀer guilt (see
end of Section 3.2). Moreover, eliciting beliefs is also interesting because it
allows us to shed light on whether and how players expect communication
to matter (see Section 3.1).
Emotional reactions of guilt were ﬁrst measured immediately after the
choices and belief elicitation and before revealing the matched participant’s
choice. Emotional reactions were measured another time immediately after
revealing the matched participant’s choice. In both measurements, subjects
ﬁlled in their emotional valence on a seven-point scale starting from “not
at all” to “very intensely” (see also Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Hopfensitz and
Reuben, 2007).4 Self-reports are generally considered to be a valid technique
to measure (Robinson and Clore, 2002). This is the case for guilt in par-
ticular since guilt is diﬃcult to measure using physiological or neurological
measurement (Adolphs, 2002).
Measurements before and after allow us to study within subjects how the
3They were asked to choose (simultaneously) between the following two options: “I
communicate to the other that I want us both to choose option 2” and “I prefer not to
communicate”.
4We also measured other emotions such as shame, sadness, happiness, anger, etc., in
order to avoid revealing the aim of the study.
4your payoﬀ the other’s payoﬀ
you choose option 1 and the other chooses option 1 6 6
you choose option 1 and the other chooses option 2 16 4
you choose option 2 and the other chooses option 1 4 16
you choose option 2 and the other chooses option 2 10 10
Table 1: Payoﬀs in the prisoner’s dilemma game
feeling of guilt due to defection is inﬂuenced by learning that the matched
participant defected as well. It is often assumed that guilt due to defection
only arises when the other does not defect as well (see Bicchieri and Erte,
2007; Lopez-Perez, 2008; Miettinen, 2006). Our design allows us to directly
verify this assumption. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is the following.
Hypothesis 1 Guilt feelings mainly arise after unilateral defection.
According to a norm-based hypothesis, communication resulting in mu-
tual agreements increases cooperation because it induces or enforces the norm
of cooperation. Deviating from the norm gives rise to guilt feelings. This is
our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Guilt feelings due to (unilateral) defection are stronger when
there is a mutual agreement to cooperate than when there is no agreement.
Finally, we also study whether guilt after unilateral defection is reduced
when an extrinsic incentive to mutually cooperate is provided (see, e.g.,
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a). To study this question, we introduced a
penalty for unilateral defectors in part of the treatments. In the ﬁrst of
these treatments, the instructions included a sentence stating that, when
one chooses option 1 (i.e., defects) while the other chooses option 2 (i.e., co-
operates), an amount of 0.20 Euro would be transferred to the other player.
In the second of these treatments, the instructions were the same, but there
was a computer screen that popped up after the communication phase to
remind the participants of the possible penalty. In the third treatment the
penalty was 1 Euro. Table 2 gives an overview of all treatments including the
number of participants. According to the crowding-out hypothesis, a small
penalty reduces feelings of guilt due to unilateral defection.
Hypothesis 3 Guilt feelings due to unilateral defection are weaker when a
small penalty for unilateral defection is introduced than when it is not intro-
duced.
5treatment 1 no penalty 44
treatment 2 penalty 0.20 32
treatment 3 penalty 0.20 and reminder screen 32
treatment 4 penalty 1 and reminder screen 32
Table 2: Treatments and number of participants
3 Results
3.1 Cooperation, communication and beliefs
In this subsection, we give a descriptive overview of average behavior, com-
munication and beliefs. In subsection 3.2. we subject our research hypotheses
to tests and discuss our ﬁndings.
Figure 1 gives an overview of cooperation rates. The rates are condi-
tioned on whether communication has resulted in a mutual agreement, and
on whether beliefs are cooperative or not (as deﬁned further below). We say
that a mutual agreement to cooperate is established when both parties made
use of the communication device to signal a willingness to cooperate.
Figure 1 shows that the overall cooperation rate is 50%. The cooperation
rate in cases with a mutual agreement is 59%, which is signiﬁcantly higher
than the 26% without agreement (p = .001 in χ2-test).5 Still, even with
mutual agreements a signiﬁcant number of subjects defected, which allows
us to study the impact of agreements on guilt.
As ﬁgure 1 shows, beliefs are more cooperative if a mutual agreement has
been reached. We say that one has cooperative beliefs if one believes that the
other has cooperated and that the other believes one has cooperated (i.e., if
both ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs are cooperative). It is clearly visible that
subjects do not ignore beliefs as they should if they followed the monetary
incentive to play the dominant strategy to defect, and they do not believe
that others ignore beliefs either. Out of the 102 subjects with a mutual
agreement, 72 have cooperative beliefs, compared to only 9 out of the 38
subjects without a mutual agreement (signiﬁcant with p = .000 in χ2-test).
A total of 74% out of the subjects with a mutual agreement and cooperative
beliefs actually cooperate, which is higher than the 23% cooperation rate
of subjects with a mutual agreement but diﬀerent beliefs (signiﬁcant with
5We do not claim that the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in this section on descriptives are direct
tests of the eﬀect of communication on cooperation or beliefs, nor a test of communication
or beliefs on behavior. Agents may self-select into the no-agreement condition, for in-
stance. For direct tests, we refer to existing literature on communication and cooperation
overviewed by, for instance, Sally (1995) and Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007).
6Figure 1: Overview of cooperation rates
p = .000 in χ2-test), and higher than the 44% cooperation rate of subjects
without a mutual agreement and with cooperative beliefs (signiﬁcant with
p = .000 in χ2-test). Cooperation rates of subjects without cooperative
beliefs and either with or without a mutual agreement are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent (23% versus 21%).
In order to understand how communication relates to ﬁrst- and second-
order beliefs, we provide a more detailed picture on communication and be-
liefs. Table 3 reports results from two probit regressions where beliefs are
regressed on a dummy variable indicating whether one has communicated
or not (self communicate) and one indicating whether the matched subject
has communicated or not (other communicate). On the one hand, commu-
nication of the other is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the belief that
the other will cooperate (it increases by 55%) and is not correlated with
the second-order belief. One’s own communication, on the other hand, is
signiﬁcantly correlated with the second-order belief (increases by 26%) and
not with the ﬁrst-order belief. Thus, the ﬁrst-level eﬀects of communica-
tion are larger and signiﬁcant: the other’s communication makes one think
that the other is more likely to cooperate and gives a conditional cooperator
a stronger incentive to cooperate.6 Similarly, one’s own communication is
mainly related to one’s second-order belief and not to one’s ﬁrst-order belief.
Table 4 gives a general overview of cooperation and communication rates
in all treatments. The communication rate measures the percentage of sub-
jects that chose to communicate. Cooperation rates are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the treatments with and without penalty (p = .585 in χ2-
6On conditional cooperation, see, for instance, Keser and van Winden (2000) and Fis-
chbacher et al. (2002).
7self communicate other communicate
left-hand-side est (p-value) est (p-value) log l pseudo R2
1st-order beliefs 0.17 (.153) 0.55 (.000)∗∗∗ -77.52 .13
2nd-order beliefs 0.26 (.054)∗ 0.21 (.128) -85.48 .04
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (two-tailed tests).
Standard errors are robust for potential within-pair dependency.
Number of observations is 140.
Marginal eﬀects are reported.
Table 3: Eﬀects of communication on beliefs
treatment penalty cooperation rate communication rate # obs
1 no 45% (20) 93% (41) 44
2 yes 53% (17) 78% (25) 32
3 yes 56% (18) 84% (27) 32
4 yes 47% (15) 84% (27) 32
avg 2,3,4 yes 52% (50) 82% (79) 96
avg all - 50% (70) 86% (120) 140
Table 4: Cooperation and communication rates across treatments
test), nor are communication rates (p = .119 in χ2-test). The introduction
of a small penalty has thus not reduced cooperation. Therefore in our ex-
periment, unlike in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b), for instance, there is no
crowding-out eﬀect on behavior. In the next subsection, we ﬁnd that there
is a crowding-out eﬀect on the emotional valence of guilt, however.
3.2 Guilt, norms and crowding-out
In this section we examine our research hypotheses. Table 5 gives a sum-
mary of median values of guilt intensities measured before and after receiving
feedback about the other’s choice.7 We distinguish between cases in which
one defects or cooperates and cases in which one has a mutual agreement or
not. Median guilt intensities measured after feedback are additionally clas-
siﬁed based on whether the matched partner defects or cooperates. A guilt
intensity of 0 refers to not feeling guilty at all and an intensity of 6 refers to
feeling it very intensely.
7Since guilt intensities are measured on an ordinal scale, the median is the appropriate
measure for central tendency. See appendices B and C for frequency distributions of guilt
intensities measured before and after feedback.
8before feedback after feedback
other defects other cooperates
participant defects
no mutual agreement 0 0 1
n=28 n=20 n=8
mutual agreement 2 0 2
n=42 n=20 n=22
participant cooperates
no mutual agreement 0 0 0
n=10 n=8 n=2
mutual agreement 0 0 0
n=60 n=22 n=38
Table 5: Median guilt intensities
The table clearly shows that feelings of guilt exclusively arise when a
subject defects. More speciﬁcally, according to the second measurement of
guilt valence when the choice of the matched partner is revealed, the guilt
feelings arise only when the subject defects and the partner cooperates. This
is clearly in line with hypothesis 1. A within-subjects Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test conﬁrms that feelings of guilt after defection are signiﬁcantly less strong
once participants learn that the counterpart also defected (p = .000). The
table further also shows that median intensities of guilt about unilaterally
defecting (measured before and after feedback) are higher with a mutual
agreement to cooperate than without such an agreement. This is in line with
hypothesis 2.
In order to statistically test research hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 we perform
six univariate ordered probit regressions where intensities of guilt measured
before and after feedback are regressed on a single binary variable of interest.
This technique has the advantage that standard errors of the estimated re-
gression coeﬃcients can be estimated such that they are robust to within-pair
dependency without losing the individual observations.8 This technique is
very useful for analyzing our data since — given the pre-play communication
phase — choices within pairs cannot be assumed to be independent. Mann-
Whitney U-tests, for instance, do not allow taking into account within-pair
dependency without losing individual observations.
Table 6 contains the six estimated coeﬃcients and associated p-values
in corresponding six univariate regressions where guilt intensity is the left-
8Robust estimation of standard errors is done using the so-called sandwich estimator
due to Huber (1967) and White (1982).
9hand-side variable and ‘mutual agreement’, ‘other cooperates’ or ‘penalty’ is
the right-hand-side variable. The variables ‘mutual agreement’ and ‘other
cooperates’ are self-explanatory. The variable ‘penalty’ indicated whether
the treatment in question was one with an exogenous penalty on unilateral
deviations. This variable is included in order to test hypothesis 3. Note that
a defecting subject is only punished in treatments 2 to 4 if she unilaterally
defects.9 Column (1) studies all cases where the subject chose to defect.
Column (2) studies only those defectors whose opponent chose to cooperate.
Column (3) studies those of the latter who moreover expected the other
to cooperate. Thus, the defectors in the third column have counterfactual
expectations.
The estimated coeﬃcients do not represent marginal eﬀects, but indicate
how the intensity of guilt (measured either before or after feedback) is re-
lated to the right-hand-side variable of interest. A positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of, say, ‘mutual agreement’ implies that the probability of observ-
ing a high (low) guilt intensity is higher (lower) with than without a mutual
agreement to cooperate.
First, we focus on the two leftmost columns of Table 6, i.e. columns (1)
and (2). The rightmost column (3) is analyzed further below. The second
coeﬃcient in the column (1) shows that a defector’s probability of feeling
more guilty is signiﬁcantly higher when the other has cooperated than when
the other has defected as well (p < .001). This further supports hypothesis
1.
Second, concerning hypothesis 2, the table illustrates two features. On
the one hand, the ﬁrst coeﬃcient in column (1) shows that a subject with
a mutual agreement to cooperate is signiﬁcantly more likely to have strong
guilt feelings about defecting (p < .010, based on before-feedback measure-
ment). On the other hand, the ﬁrst coeﬃcient in column (2) shows that
this is true also for unilaterally defection (p < .050, based on after-feedback
measurement). Hypothesis 2 is thus supported as well.
Finally, since the second coeﬃcient in column (2) is negative and sig-
niﬁcant, also hypothesis 3 is supported by the data. Thus, a penalty for
unilateral defection reduces the probability of having strong guilt feelings
about it (p < .050).10
9We do not regress guilt measured before feedback on a penalty variable since at the
point of measurement a deviating subject does not know yet whether she will be actually
punished. The coeﬃcient in a regression of guilt before feedback on a ‘potential penalty’
variable, which measures whether a penalty is potentially introduced (i.e., when one defects
in treatments 2 to 4), is not signiﬁcant (p = .356).
10Regressions using shame instead of guilt as a dependent variable produce similar re-




mutual agreement 0.78 (.006)∗∗∗ -
guilt after feedback
other cooperates 1.38 (.000)∗∗∗ -
mutual agreement - 0.74 (.045)∗∗ 1.16 (.042)∗∗
penalty - -0.93 (.017)∗∗ -0.71 (.116)
(1) Given defection.
(2) Given defection and other’s cooperation.
(3) Given defection and other’s cooperation by surprise.
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% level (one-tailed tests).
p-values are in brackets.
Table 6: Estimated coeﬃcients of six regressions of guilt (including p-values)
Let us now turn to column (3) in table 6 which tackles the issue of reverse
causality. Although we are primarily interested in experienced guilt, which
is measured after players have made choices in the PD, choices may very well
be motivated by avoidance of expected guilt (see, e.g., Dufwenberg, 2002;
Bicchieri and Erte, 2007; Miettinen, 2006; Lopez-Perez, 2008). That antici-
pated guilt inﬂuences choices may weaken causal eﬀects such that coeﬃcients
may reﬂect mere correlations. Yet, our design allows us to circumvent this
problem.
As table 5 shows, there is no guilt if the other defects. This feature of
guilt, together with the fact that we elicit beliefs after choices and before
revealing outcomes, allows us to tackle this endogeneity issue. There are 15
players who expected the other to defect, but surprisingly ended up with a
cooperating partner and feeling guilty about defecting. We can safely assume
that these players were not motivated by avoiding expected feelings of guilt
when deciding to defect. That is, we can assume that in the latter case, the
unexpected combination of own defection and the other’s cooperation causes
guilt feelings. The estimates presented in column (3) in table 6 are based
on ordered probit regressions where only subjects who unilaterally defect
and expected the other to defect are included. Based on these estimates, the
‘mutual agreement’ variable is still positive and signiﬁcant (p < .050). The
hypotheses 1 and 3), but not with respect to the eﬀect of a mutual agreement (cf. hypoth-
esis 2). This is not surprising given that shame is taken to be a diﬀerent emotion than
guilt in recent studies in social psychology (see, e.g., Eisenberg, 2000; Smith et al., 2002;
Fontaine et al., 2006; Tangney et al., 2007). Guilt is generally viewed as the ‘more moral’
emotion of the two.
11‘penalty’ variable fails to be signiﬁcant, however.
4 Conclusion
By studying reported guilt valences in a prisoner’s dilemma with commu-
nication, we shed new light on why communication increases cooperation in
those settings. We design a simple two-player prisoner’s dilemma experiment
where parties can communicate a willingness to cooperate prior to choosing
whether to cooperate or to defect and where guilt valences are elicited before
and after getting feedback about the matched person’s action. In line with
earlier experiments, our data show that the cooperation rate is higher when
parties engage in a mutual agreement to cooperate.
Our focus is on how experienced guilt is related to choices and commu-
nication in the prisoner’s dilemma. By measuring experienced guilt we aim
to identify whether subjects interpret an agreement to cooperate as estab-
lishing and strengthening a normative code of cooperation. We view guilt as
a mediation emotion that helps to understand which behavior is considered
normatively ideal.
We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that subjects experience guilt mainly when they defect,
and more speciﬁcally when they unilaterally defect. Second, we ﬁnd that
guilt feelings due to (unilateral) defection are stronger with than without a
mutual cooperative agreement. That is, we provide evidence in favor of mu-
tual cooperation being considered to be a behavioral norm, the more so when
a mutual agreement to cooperate is in place. Given that subjects learn to
avoid choices that cause guilt (like in Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Hopfensitz and
Reuben, 2007) and that the payoﬀ from mutual cooperation is higher than the
payoﬀ from mutual defection11, one should thus expect that communication
increases cooperation rates. Finally, we also ﬁnd that ﬁning unilateral defec-
tion reduces feelings of guilt, which is in line with the so-called crowding-out
ﬁndings in the literature.
We are not aware of previous experimental studies that survey emotions
during or after the play of a social dilemma with communication. More gen-
erally, we see such emotional valence elicitation as a recommendable method
to complement behavioral evidence to better understand the reasons behind
the choice patterns in experiments.
11Another way of avoiding feelings of guilt is to refrain from committing to a cooperative
agreement.
12Appendix A: Translation of written instruc-
tions
Welcome to the experiment! The experiment is part of a research program
ﬁnanced by a research foundation. You will be asked to make a number of
decisions. It is important that you follow the instructions carefully, because
you can earn a considerable amount of money. At the end of the experiment,
you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash. During the experiment
you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If something is not clear,
please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
In the experiment you will be matched with a randomly chosen partici-
pant. You both get the same instructions. What you will earn, depends on
your own choice and the choice of this other participant. His/her identity
will not be revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to him/her.
The other participant will be referred to by “the other” in what follows. We
ask you and the other to make a choice between option 1 and option 2. What
you and the other will earn in Euro will be calculated as follows: see table 1.
Before entering your choices you and the other have the possibility to
communicate to each other that you would like both to choose option 2
(computer screen called COMMUNICATION). We ask you to decide on this
screen whether you prefer not to communicate or whether you communicate
that you want both (you and the other) to choose option 2. After you
sent your communication, you will be informed about what the other has
communicated.
The communications are not binding.
[If you end up choosing option 1 and the other ends up choosing option
2, a penalty of 0,20 (1) Euro will be subtracted from your earnings and
transferred to the other.] [only included in treatments 2, 3 and 4]
On the screen called CHOICE ENTRY you enter your ﬁnal choice (option
1 or option 2).
Before the actual experiment starts, you will be asked to answer some
control questions on the computer. This is to test whether you understand
the payoﬀ table. Please follow the instructions on the screen from now on.
13Appendix B: Frequency distribution of guilt
intensity measured before feedback
14Appendix C: Frequency distribution of guilt
intensity after feedback
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